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Increasing competition for water across sectors increases the importance of the river 
basin as the appropriate unit of analysis to address the challenges facing water resources 
management; and modeling at this scale can provide essential information for policymakers 
in their resource allocation decisions.  This paper introduces an integrated economic-
hydrologic modeling framework that accounts for the interactions between water 
allocation, farmer input choice, agricultural productivity, nonagricultural water demand, 
and resource degradation in order to estimate the social and economic gains from 
improvement in the allocation and efficiency of water use.  The model is applied to the 
Maipo River Basin in Chile.  Economic benefits to water use are evaluated for different 
demand management instruments, including markets in tradable water rights, based on 
production and benefit functions with respect to water for the agricultural and urban-
industrial sectors. 
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M.W. Rosegrant, C. Ringler, D.C. McKinney, 
X. Cai, A. Keller, and G. Donoso 
 
1.   INTRODUCTION 
With growing scarcity and increasing competition for water across sectors, the need 
for efficient, equitable, and sustainable water allocation policies has increased in 
importance in water resources management.  These policies can best be examined at the 
river basin level, which link essential hydrologic, economic, agronomic, and institutional 
relationships as well as water uses and users and their allocation decisions. 
To carry out this analysis, an integrated economic-hydrologic modeling framework 
at the basin level has been developed that accounts for the interactions between water 
allocation, farmer input choice, agricultural productivity, nonagricultural water demand, and 
resource degradation in order to estimate the social and economic gains from improvement in 
the allocation and efficiency of water use.  An application to the Maipo River Basin in Chile 
is presented.  The following sections give an overview on the research site, introduce the 
modeling framework, and present results of the model application. 
2.   THE MAIPO RIVER BASIN 
The Maipo River Basin, located in a key agricultural region in the metropolitan area 
of central Chile, is a prime example of a “mature water economy” (see Randall 1981) with 




sectors.  The basin is characterized by a very dynamic agricultural sector—serving an 
irrigated area of about 127,000 ha (out of a total catchment area of 15,380 km
2)—and a 
rapidly growing industrial and urban sector—in particular in and surrounding the capital 
city of Santiago with a population of more than 5 million people.  More than 90% of the 
irrigated area in the area depends on water withdrawals from surface flows.  Annual flows 
in the Maipo River average 4,445 million m
3.  River fluctuations are predominantly glacial 
in nature, with considerable flows in summer (Nov.-Feb.) and very pronounced reductions 
in winter (April-June).   
In the mid-1990s, total water withdrawals at the off-take level in the Maipo River 
Basin were estimated at 2,144 million m
3.  Agriculture accounted for 64% of total 
withdrawals, domestic uses for 25%, and industry for the remaining 11%.  The basin 
includes 8 large irrigation districts with areas of 1,300-45,000 ha.  Irrigated area in the 
basin has been gradually declining due to increasing demands by the domestic and 
industrial sectors for both water and land resources, among other factors.  By the mid-70s, 
urban Santiago had already encroached on more than 30,000 ha of productive irrigated land 
(Court Moock et al. 1979).  However, the closeness to the capital city also provides a 
profitable outlet for high-value crop production both for the local market and for the 
dynamic export sector. 
The largest municipal water company, Empresa Metropolitan de Obras Sanitarias 
(EMOS), supplies about 85% of Santiago’s population as well as other urban areas.  It 
owns about 17% of the volume of flow in the upper Maipo River, plus the storage of the El 
Yeso reservoir with a capacity of about 256 million m
3 (Donoso 1997).  Supplies for 




from privately owned wells and, in a few cases, from irrigation canals.  All hydropower 
stations in the basin are of the run-of-the river type. 
Competition among the different water users and uses, in particular, agriculture and 
domestic and industrial water uses, is increasing rapidly.  According to Anton (1993), 
agricultural areas are mostly flood irrigated, and irrigation efficiencies range from 20% to 
60% depending on local conditions.  EMOS estimates an increase in domestic water 
demand of about 330 million m
3 between 1997 and 2022, which it intends to meet chiefly 
through better use of existing water rights, the purchase of additional rights from irrigation 
districts, and additional extraction of groundwater.  However, in the past, EMOS has been 
unable to purchase sufficient shares from irrigation districts, and both industry and 
agriculture are competing for groundwater sources at levels surpassing the recharge 
capacities of the aquifers in the Metropolitan area (Hearne 1998; Bolelli 1997).  Moreover, 
increasing competition for scarce water resources in the basin has led to growing pollution 
problems that have yet to be addressed by policy solutions (Anton 1993).  Although Chile 
has established the economic instrument of markets in tradable water rights following the 
Water Law of 1981, which promotes the allocation of water to the uses with the highest 
values, room for improvement in the areas of water rights for environmental and 
hydropower (non-consumptive) uses has become evident.  These challenges in the Maipo 
basin will be addressed with the integrated economic-hydrologic modeling framework 








3.   THE RIVER BASIN MODEL 
MODELING APPROACH 
The river basin modeling system is developed as a node-link network, in which 
nodes represent physical entities and links represent the connection between these entities 
(Figure 1).  The nodes included in the network are: (1) source nodes, such as rivers, 
reservoirs, and groundwater aquifers; and (2) demand nodes, such as irrigation fields, 
industrial plants, and households.  Each distribution node is a location where water is 
diverted to different sites for beneficial use.  The inflows to these nodes include water 
flows from the headwaters of the river basin and rainfall drainage entering the entities.  No 
prior storage is assumed for the river nodes.  A number of agricultural and municipal and 
industrial (M&I) demand sites or nodes have been spatially connected to the basin network.  
Agricultural demand sites are delineated according to the irrigation districts.  At each 
agricultural demand site, water is allocated to a series of crops, according to their water 
requirements and economic profitability.  Both crop area and yield are determined 
endogenously in the model.  Two demand sites have been allocated to the major urban area, 
Santiago.  
An existing hydrologic model, successfully applied to the Amu Darya and Syr 
Darya river basins in Central Asia, has been adapted to the Chilean context (McKinney and 
Cai 1997).  In addition, a prototype economic optimization model has been developed in 
order to estimate economic returns to water use.  Although the model has been developed 
as an optimization model, simulation components have been included to better solve the 



















































































simulated endogenously within the optimization model and an external crop-water 
simulation model is used to estimate the crop yield function, with water, salinity and 
irrigation technology as variables. 
Both instream and off-stream water uses are considered in the model.  Instream 
uses include flows for waste dilution and hydropower generation.  Off-stream uses include 
water diversion for agriculture and municipal and industry (M&I) water uses.  The 
valuation of instream and off-stream uses is implemented in a unified economic objective 
function, which is constrained by hydrologic, environmental, and institutional relations.  
Water demand is determined endogenously within the model by using empirical agronomic 
production functions (yield vs. water, irrigation technology, salinity) and an M&I water 
demand function based on a market inverse demand function.  Water supply is determined 
through the hydrologic water balance in the river basin with extension to the irrigated crop 
fields at each irrigation demand site.  Water demand and water supply are then integrated 
into an endogenous system and balanced based on the economic objective of maximizing 
benefits from water use, including irrigation, hydropower, and M&I benefits.  Both water 
quantity and water quality in terms of salinity are simulated in the model.  The salt 
concentration in the return flow from irrigated areas is explicitly calculated in the model.  
This allows the endogenous consideration of this externality with respect to upstream and 
downstream irrigation districts.  The model includes all the essential relationships of these 







Thematically, the modeling framework includes three components: (1) hydrologic 
components, including the water and salt balance in reservoirs, river reaches and aquifers 
within the river basin; (2) water use components, including water for irrigation and M&I 
water uses; and (3) economic components, including the calculation of benefits from 
irrigation, hydropower, and M&I demand sites.   
Hydrologic relations and processes are based on the flow network, which is an 
abstracted representation of the spatial relationships between the physical entities in the 
basin.  The major hydrologic relations/processes include: flow transport and balance from 
river outlets/reservoirs to crop fields or M&I demand sites; salt transport and balance from 
river outlets/reservoirs to irrigated crop fields; return flows from irrigated and urban areas; 
interaction between surface and groundwater; evapotranspiration in irrigated areas, and 
hydropower generation as well as physical bounds on storage, flows, diversions and salt 
concentrations.  The mathematical expressions for these relations, as well as the calculation 
of deep percolation, return flow from agricultural and M&I demand sites, and the 
interaction between surface and groundwater can be found in Rosegrant et al. (1999).  It is 
assumed that the water supply starts from rivers and reservoirs.  Effective rainfall is 
calculated outside of the model, and included into the model as a constant parameter.  
The agronomic relations involved in the simulation model are adapted from Dinar 
and Letey (1996), (see also Letey and Dinar 1986, and Dinar et al. 1991).  A curve-linear 
relationship is assumed between crop yield and seasonal applied nonsaline water.  Crop 
yield is simulated under given water application, irrigation technology (the Christiensen 




results, a regression function of crop yield with water application, irrigation uniformity, and 
salinity was derived through the estimation of the parameters a0-a2 and b0-b8 in equation (1).  
The function, with specific parameters that have been estimated for all crops in the model, is 
directly used in the optimization model to calculate crop yields with varying water 
application, salt concentration, and CUC.  
The crop yield function is specified as follows: 
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and 
Ya        denotes crop yield (metric tons [mt]/ha), 
Ymax   is the maximum attainable yield (mt/ha) 
a0, a1, a 2  are regression coefficients,  
b0  to b8  are regression coefficients, 
wi   denotes infiltrated water (mm) 
Emax  is the maximum evapotranspiration (mm) 
c     is the salt concentration in water application (dS/m), and 
u     is the Christiensen Uniformity Coefficient (CUC). 
Uniformity (CUC) is used as a surrogate for both irrigation technology and 
irrigation management activities.  The CUC value varies from approximately 50 for flood 




varies with management activities.  By including explicit representation of technology, the 
choice of water application technology can be determined endogenously.  The profit from 
agricultural demand sites is equal to crop revenue minus fixed crop cost, irrigation 
technology improvement cost, and water supply cost.  The function for profits from 
irrigation (VA) at demand site dm is specified as follows: 
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in which  
 
A  denotes harvested area (ha) 
cp  is the crop type 
p   is crop price (US$/mt) 
fc   is fixed crop cost (US$/ha) 
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o
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  is the technology cost (US$/ha); formulation following Dinar and 
  Letey, 1996; (higher CUC values are associated with 
  greater capital cost for irrigation and/or management costs) 
wp   is the water price (US$/m
3) 
w   is the amount of water delivered to demand sites (m
3) 
k0  is the intercept of the technology cost function 
k1  is the cost coefficient per unit of u 




Figure 2  Crop yield function, crop yield (wheat) vs. water application 



























The function is based on a synthesis of partial secondary data and in its current 
form only applies to surface water.  The willingness to pay for water at full use is estimated 
at US$0.35 per m
3.  The per unit value of water for M&I was estimated at 3.5 times the per 
unit value of water in agriculture, based on an iterative search process on value vs. water 
demand, so that water withdrawal to irrigation and to M&I in the base year model solution 
matches historical values.  The small amount of local groundwater use (about 12% of 
annual M&I withdrawals or 95 million m
3) is treated as a fixed amount.  Figure 3 shows 







0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5







































0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500






















































Benefits from power generation are relatively small in the Maipo Basin compared 
to off-stream water uses.  The profit from power generation (VP) at power station pwst is 
calculated as: 
 
  )] pwst ( t cos p ) pwst ( pprice [ ) pd , pwst ( power ) pwst ( VP
pd
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where power is the power production, for each power station and period (KWh), which is 
a function of water flow for runoff stations, and of water release and reservoir head for 




the price of power production for each power station (US$/KWh); and pcost is the cost of 
power production, for each power station (US$/KWh). 
The model also includes a series of institutional rules, including minimum required 
water supply to a demand site, minimum and maximum crop production, flow requirement 
through a river reach for environmental and ecological purposes, and maximum allowed 
salinity in the water system.  The objective is to maximize economic profit from water 
supply for irrigation, M&I water use, and hydroelectric power generation, subject to 
institutional, physical, and other constraints.  The objective function is specified as follows:  
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wgt  denotes the weight for the penalty 
and penalty is defined as: 
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where, over all demand sites and crops, 
 
pm  is the maximum crop production (mt),  
cpprice is the crop selling price (US$/mt),  
mdft  is the maximum stage deficit within a crop growth season, 
adft  is the average stage deficit within a crop growth season. 




reserved for environmental (instream) uses.  The source salinity is 0.3 g/l.  No water right is 
set up and water withdrawals to demand sites depend on their respective demands with the 
objective of maximizing basin benefits.  
The model incorporates 15 crops, but the five main crops with regard to harvested 
(irrigated) area are annual forage, corn, grapes, peach and other orchard trees, and wheat.  
Table 1 presents the production for these crops determined by the model for the irrigation 
demand sites in the basin, compared with the actual production data for 1994-96.  As can 
be seen, the basin-optimizing solution estimates a higher overall production, compared to the 
1994-96 values.  Moreover, the solution favors the crops with higher profit per unit of water 
supplied, such as peach and grapes.  Table 2 shows the baseline harvested area derived from 
the model and a comparison with the actual situation in the basin in the mid-1990s.  The 
total harvested area estimated by the model is 146,007 hectares, compared to an area under 
production in 1994-96 of 127,111 ha.  Again, crops that demand large amounts of water 
and/or have lower economic values account for relatively less area in the model result 
compared to the actual data.  Moreover, water withdrawals in the M&I demand sites reach 
the benefit-maximizing demand level at 1,457 million m
3.  
Under the baseline, total effective rainfall is estimated at 116 million m
3.  Total 
water withdrawals are estimated at 3,817 million m
3, 86% of the total inflows of 4,445 
million m
3.  Water withdrawals are lowest in the months of June and July, as only perennial 
crops are present during this time.  The apparent excess use of surface water—withdrawals 
exceed source flows - during the months of Jan.-March and Nov.-Dec. can be explained 
with the high level of return flows that are being reused during these months.  Total return 
flows amount to 872 million m




Table 1  Crop production in the basin, basin-optimizing result and actual data 
 
  Wheat  Corn  Annual 
Forage 
Grapes  Peach  Other  Total 
Demand Site  (metric tons) 
A1  31,022  38,267  28,620  176,022  129,252  532,849  936,032 
A2  10,734  14,319  10,721  72,171  50,142  189,975  348,061 
A3  21,827  48,169  22,321  20,218  27,935  288,623  429,093 
A4  744  2,278  869  995  2,814  12,296  19,995 
A5  41,466  30,419  28,875  36,397  51,232  360,569  548,960 
A6  1,678  3,545  1,941  14,316  9,885  37,544  68,908 
A7  2,656  174  3,706  29  30  7,734  14,328 
A8  13,473  478  5,428  48,675  46,631  129,140  243,825 
Basin total  123,600  137,647  102,482  368,822  317,921 1,558,730  2,609,202 
               
Actual prod  105,159  165,210  192,140  220,109  193,271 1,004,935  1,880,824 
 
Note: Actual production is average for 1994-96.   
As crop diversity in the basin is extremely high, some crops are averages of 
aggregate production of similar crops.  Peach, for example, includes almond, 
apricot, cherry, nectarines, peach, and plum. 
Source of actual production data: Donoso 1997. 
 
 
Table 2  Harvested area, basin-optimizing result 
 
  Wheat  Corn  Annual 
Forage 
Grape  Peach  Other  Total 
Demand Site  (hectares) 
A1  5,607  4,196  2,529  9,264  6,463  20,271  48,329 
A2  1,925  1,574  936  3,798  2,527  7,035  17,795 
A3  3,899  5,219  1,925  1,064  1,401  12,620  26,128 
A4  135  248  76  52  141  505  1,157 
A5  7,446  3,344  2,521  1,916  2,574  15,840  33,642 
A6  302  384  170  753  494  1,367  3,471 
A7  482  19  325  2  2  397  1,227 
A8  2,440  53  481  2,562  2,346  6,377  14,258 
               
Basin total  22,235  15,037  8,963  19,412  15,947  64,412  146,007 
Model/Actual  1.0  0.8  0.6  1.5  1.5  1.3  1.1 
 




Actual crop evapotranspiration is estimated at 954 million m
3, 99.7% of the total 
potential crop evapotranspiration of 956 million m
3.  This value compares well with the 
data estimated in Donoso (1997) of 972 million m
3.  According to the model results, total 
agricultural water withdrawals amount to 2,360 million m
3, which again is close to the 
2,107 million m
3 estimated in Donoso (1997).  The difference can be explained, in part, by 
the different irrigation efficiencies.  The overall efficiency estimated by local experts is 
about 45%, whereas the efficiency according to model results is 40.4%. 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Four sensitivity analyses are presented to test the robustness of the model results: 
changes in hydrologic levels, irrigation technology cost, crop price, and source salinity 
(Table 3).  According to the sensitivity analyses, M&I water withdrawals and benefits 
barely change with the changing range of technology cost, crop price, and source salinity 
under conditions of normal flow.  This is because, at normal inflows, the M&I demand 
sites can withdraw up to their benefit-maximizing level within the varying range of those 
parameters.  However, M&I withdrawals and benefits do vary in the dry-year case (see 
Table 4). 
With a reduction of normal inflows by half, water withdrawals and benefits for both 
agricultural and M&I demand sites decline sharply.  Agricultural profits decrease by 37% 
and M&I benefits decline by 9% compared to normal inflows.  Moreover, water 
withdrawals plunge by 42% for irrigation and by 13% in M&I demand sites.  Thus, in the 
case of drought, the agriculture sector is much more affected.  Agricultural water 




Table 3  Sensitivity analysis, various parameters 










  (%) 
Inflow  50  58.3  86.7  63.1  90.5 
  150  101.2  100.0  100.1  100.0 
           
Technology cost  75  100.0  100.0  102.5  100.0 
  125  100.0  100.0  97.5  100.0 
  150  100.0  100.0  95.1  100.0 
           
Crop price  75  94.8  100.0  39.8  100.0 
  125  101.6  100.0  161.0  100.0 
           
Salinity in source  50  95.5  100.0  102.8  100.0 
  150  101.6  100.0  96.4  100.0 
  200  105.1  100.0  86.4  100.0 
 
Note:  Sensitivity analyses, except for the inflow scenarios, were carried out based on 
normal flow.  All percentages are relative to the baseline. 
 
 
Table 4  Sensitivity analysis for water price at 50% of normal inflow 
 
  SCENARIO 
  I  II  III  IV 
          Water price (US$/m
3)  0  0.02  0.04  0.08 
Irrigation withdrawals (M m
3)  1,387  1,380  1,351  1,326 
Crop area (irrigated) (ha)  115,200  115,191  115,176  115,032 
M&I water withdrawal (M m
3)  1,258  1,263  1,283  1,303 
Irrigation profits (M US$)  224  196  165  130 
M&I profits (M US$)  550  552  558  570 
Total profits (M US$)  774  748  722  700 
 
vary only slightly with changes in technology cost.  Proportional changes over all crop 
prices in the range of "25% have only small effects on irrigation water withdrawals.  
However, farmer incomes from irrigation are significantly affected.  With a reduction of 
crop prices by 25%, irrigation water withdrawals decline by 5%, whereas profits from 




A doubling of the source salinity leads to an increase in irrigation water 
withdrawals for salt leaching by 5%.  Increased salt leaching reduces profits from irrigation 
by 14%.  Moreover, changes in the salinity level influence crop patterns, with a decline in 
the harvested area of crops with lower salt tolerance.  With doubled source salinity, the area 
planted to maize declines to 8% from 10% of total area planted at the ‘baseline’ source 
salinity of 0.3 g/l, whereas the area planted with wheat—a more salt tolerant crop—
increases to 18% from 15% in the basin-optimizing case. 
Table 4 shows the effects of changes in the water price for agriculture on water 
withdrawals and incomes in the irrigation and M&I sectors for a drought-year case (50% of 
normal inflows).  With an increase in the water price for irrigation from zero to US$0.08 
per m
3, water withdrawals for agriculture decline by 5%, from 1,387 million m
3 to 1,326 
million m
3.  However, changes in the water price barely affect the crop area.  Irrigated area 
is maintained because farmers shift on the margin to more water efficient crops and reduce 
water use per hectare.  Although both water withdrawals and irrigated crop area barely 
change with varying water prices, farmer incomes can drop drastically under this 
'administrative price scenario': by 42% from US$224 million to US$130 million with 
increasing prices.  M&I benefits, on the other hand, increase steadily with continuing water 
price increases in agriculture, from US$550 million to US$570 million and M&I water 
withdrawals increase by 3.6%.  With water prices already quite high (the normal price is 
higher than most farmers in the United States pay), further price increases are a blunt 
instrument for influencing water demand.  Under these circumstances, water markets that 




ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF WATER TRADING 
There are two fundamental strategies for dealing with water scarcity in river basins, 
supply management and demand management; the former involves activities to locate, 
develop, and exploit new sources of water, and the latter addresses the incentives and 
mechanisms that promote water conservation and efficient use of water.  
The primary alternative to quantity-based allocation of water is incentive-based 
allocation, either through volumetric water prices or through markets in tradable water 
rights.  The empirical evidence shows that farmers are price responsive in their use of 
irrigation water (Rosegrant et al. 1995; Gardner 1983).  The choice between administered 
prices and markets should be largely a function of which system has the lowest 
administrative and transaction costs (TC).  Markets in tradable water rights can reduce 
information costs; increase farmer acceptance and participation; empower water users; and 
provide security and incentives for investment and for internalizing the external costs of 
water uses.  Market allocation can provide flexibility in response to water demands, 
permitting the selling and purchasing of water across sectors, across districts, and across 
time by opening opportunities for exchange where they are needed.  The outcomes of the 
exchange process reflect the water scarcity condition in the area with water flowing to the 
uses where its marginal value is highest (Rosegrant and Binswanger 1994; Rosegrant 1997).  
Markets also provide the foundation for water leasing and option contracts, which can 
quickly mitigate acute, short-term urban water shortages while maintaining the agricultural 
production base (Michelsen and Young 1993).  Establishment of markets in tradable property 
rights does not imply free markets in water.  Rather, the system would be one of managed 




environmental effects that are not eliminated by the change in incentives.  Tradable water 
rights could lead to massive transfers of water to urban and industrial centers.  Therefore, 
farmers need to be protected by adequate institutions and organizations.  The Chilean Water 
Law of 1981 established the basic characteristics of property rights over water as a 
proportional share over a variable flow or quantity.  Changes in allocation of water within 
and between sectors are realized through markets in tradable water rights (for details, see 
Gazmuri Schleyer and Rosegrant 1996; Hearne and Easter 1995). 
The integrated economic-hydrologic river basin model allows for a fairly realistic 
representation and analysis of water markets.  Water trading in the basin is constrained by 
the hydrologic balance in the river basin network; water is traded taking account of the 
physical and technical constraints of the various demand sites, reflecting their relative 
profitability in trading prices; water trades reflect the relative seasonal water scarcity in the 
basin that is influenced by both basin inflows and the cropping pattern in agricultural demand 
sites (whereas the M&I water demands are more stable); and negative externalities, like 
increased salinity in downstream reaches due to incremental irrigation water withdrawals 
upstream, are endogenous to the model framework. 
Model Formulation for Water Trading 
To extend the model to water trading analysis, the relationship between the shadow 
price of water and water withdrawal is first determined for each demand site.  For this, the 
model is run separately for each demand site with varying water withdrawals as inputs and 
shadow prices or marginal values as output derived from the water balance equations (each 
irrigation demand site includes a water balance equation for each of up to 15 crops).  These 
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supply level for each demand site.  Based on these input and output values a regression 
function is estimated for the shadow price vs. water withdrawal  for each demand site.  
Figure 4 shows the regression relationship between shadow price and water withdrawals 
for one agricultural demand site (A5).  
Water rights are allocated proportionally to total inflows based on historical 
withdrawals for M&I areas and on the harvested (irrigated) area for agricultural demand 
sites.  Thus, with reduced inflows, the realized volumes of the water rights change without 
changes in the rights structure.  The water right refers to surface water only.  To determine 
the lower bound for profits from water trade by demand site (it is assumed that no demand 
site can lose from trading), the model is solved for the case of water rights without trading.  
Finally, the regression relationships of shadow price vs. water withdrawal for all 
agricultural and M&I demand sites, the water rights, and other water trading related 
constraints (see Rosegrant et al. 1999) are added to the basin model.  It is  
 





assumed that the trading price for each demand site is equal to its shadow price for water.  
This model is then solved to determine the water trading price, wtp, and the volume of 
water bought and sold by demand site. 
Trade is allowed on a monthly basis throughout the basin and transaction costs are 
incurred by both buyer and seller (US$0.04 per m
3).  Up to four months of the realized 
monthly water right can be traded as the monthly balances had been found as too tight of a 
constraint on water supply for crop growth.   
Water Trading Analysis 
Three scenarios are compared to assess the impact of water trading: a baseline with 
omniscient decision-maker optimizing benefits for the entire basin (BO); water rights 
with no trading permitted (WR), and water rights with trading (WRT).  The salinity 
variable is fixed for all three water-trading scenarios.  The results compare two cases for 
each of these three scenarios: hydrologic level at 100% of the normal inflow and at 60% 
of the normal inflow (Table 5).  In addition, three transaction cost scenarios are analyzed 
based on normal inflow (Table 6).  The description of results will concentrate on the 
drought-year scenario (Case B, 60% of normal inflow), as the benefits vary more clearly 
by economic instrument employed. 
In the case of a drought year, total water withdrawals are highest for the basin 
optimizing case (BO), as each and every demand site can withdraw according to its 
monthly needs subject to an optimum result for the basin as a whole.  These needs are thus 
only confined by physical parameters, such as relative location in the basin and institutional 
requirements.  Water withdrawals decline substantially in the WR case, relative to BO, 





Table 5  Scenario analysis: basin-optimizing solution, water rights without trade, and water rights trading 
  Withdrawals  Water rights  Net trade    Net profits  'Gains'
 b/  Shadow price of water 
Demand sites  BO  WR  WRT
a/  WR&WRT  WRT    BO  WR  WRT  WRT    BO  WR  WRT 
    (million m
3)    (million US$)    (US$/m
3) 
 
Case A: 100% of normal inflow   
                             
A1  696  617  610  867  13    120  117  118  1    0.044  0.128  0.132 
A2  266  243  234  341  8    46  45  45  1    0.044  0.111  0.123 
A3  371  391  349  547  70    47  49  52  2    0.046  0.075  0.119 
A4  16  15  14  21  3    2  2  3  0    0.045  0.083  0.111 
A5  506  502  444  704  147    65  67  71  5    0.051  0.091  0.138 
A6  54  46  45  64  1    9  8  8  0    0.045  0.134  0.147 
A7  15  17  14  25  10    2  2  2  1    0.072  0.040  0.099 
A8  206  154  153  216  1    37  31  31  0    0.044  0.189  0.177 
M1  991  678  841  678  -163    417  293  353  60    0.019  0.975  0.415 
M2  460  315  404  315  -90    193  135  166  32    0.019  1.014  0.383 
Basin total  3,581  2,977  3,108  3,778  0    939  749  850  101         
                             
Case B: 60% of normal inflow                     
                             
A1  514  479  432  522  47    95  89  99  10    0.097  0.134  0.232 
A2  222  188  166  205  90    40  36  52  17    0.102  0.230  0.221 
A3  305  303  279  329  23    41  41  43  3    0.078  0.168  0.194 
A4  7  11  10  13  2    1  1  2  1    0.096  0.100  0.195 
A5  395  391  350  423  112    56  55  70  16    0.110  0.111  0.192 
A6  43  34  33  38  2    8  7  7  1    0.077  0.225  0.224 
A7  11  11  11  15  2    1  1  2  1    0.127  0.059  0.146 
A8  142  120  102  130  18    27  23  25  2    0.098  0.259  0.259 
M1  974  518  713  408  -195    413  102  266  164    0.056  1.439  0.789 
M2  453  240  342  189  -101    192  34  129  94    0.056  1.720  0.735 
Basin total  3,067  2,296  2,437  2,272  0    874  389  696  307         
BO = baseline optimization without water rights; WR = water rights but nontradable; WRT = tradable water rights. 





Table 6  Transaction cost scenarios (Case A) 
 







3)  (million m
3)  (million US$)  (US$/m
3) 
           
0.00  3,119  278  871  122  0.1808 
0.04  3,108  264  850  101  0.1844 
0.10  3,075  236  822  73  0.4127 
0.20  3,051  138  755  6  1.2680 
 
Agricultural withdrawals are often actually below the actual water right, because dry-
season flows are inadequate to fulfill all crop water requirements.  Another reason is that, 
in about half of the months, only perennial crops are grown, and thus withdrawals are far 
below the allotted flow. 
When water can be traded, irrigation withdrawals actually decline further, albeit not 
very much.  Irrigation withdrawals decline because the irrigation districts sell part of their 
water right to the M&I demand sites, thereby reaping substantial profits.  In the dry-year 
case, a total water volume of 296 million m
3 is traded, about 11% of total dry-year inflows.  
In the case of normal inflows, 264 million m
3 of water is traded, about 6% of total inflow.  
M&I areas are the main buyers in both cases, purchasing virtually all the water offered by the 
irrigation districts.  All irrigation districts are net sellers of water over the course of the year.  
Under the drought-year case, only district A8 purchases 0.2 million m
3 of water to maintain 
its cropping pattern that features the largest share of higher-valued, perennial crops (grapes, 
peach, among others, see Table 2).  In the case of normal inflows, on the other hand, the 
marginal value of water is much lower, and two agricultural demand sites, A6 and A8, 
purchase water (0.2 million m
3 and 10.8 million m
3, respectively) to supplement their crop 





As the WR system does not allow the transfer of water to more beneficial uses, 
benefits from water uses are significantly reduced by locking the resource into relatively 
low valued uses during shortages.  As a result, total net benefits are less than one-half of the 
optimizing solution (US$389 million compared with US$874 million).  By permitting 
trading, water moves from less productive agricultural uses into higher-valued urban water 
uses while at the same time benefiting farm incomes.  Total benefits in the M&I demand 
sites almost triple, compared to the WR case, but gains are also significant for the irrigation 
districts and each district can increase net profits, by between 6% and 62%, depending on 
their respective physical and other characteristics.  Total net profits of the sector increase 
by about 20%, from US$253 million to US$301 million.  In irrigation districts A1-A5 and 
A7, total net profits under the WRT scenario are even higher than for the basin-optimizing 
case.  This is due to the higher value of the scarcer water and the resulting benefits from 
trade and does not occur in Case A with normal inflow levels.  
Moreover, net profits from crop production decline only slightly with trading: from 
US$253 million to US$244 million.  Total crop production also barely declines, from 1.866 
million mt to 1.729 million mt.  In addition, the proportion of higher-value perennial crops 
increases substantially from the WR to the WRT scenarios, from 14% to 19% for grapes 
and from 13% to 16% for peach, for example.  These results not only show the advantages 
of the water market approach compared to the WR case, but also to the administrative price 
scenario presented in the sensitivity analysis, in which water is also reallocated from 
agricultural to nonagricultural uses, but at a punitive cost to agricultural incomes. 
In the shift from fixed proportional water rights to trade, total benefits to the basin 





total benefits under water trading are actually even closer to the pure optimum than shown 
here, because no monitoring/transaction costs are charged for the omniscient decision-
maker when in fact the cost would likely be very high. 
For the water-trading scenario, it is currently assumed that both buyer and seller 
contribute equally to the transaction costs (US$0.04 per m
3).  Three transaction cost 
scenarios were run in addition to this base trading scenario: zero transaction cost, US$0.1 
per m
3, and US$0.2 per m
3.  The results are shown in Table 6.  As can be expected, water 
withdrawals decline with increasing transaction cost, and the volume of water traded 
plunges by more than half, from 278 million m
3 for the case without transaction cost to 138 
million m
3 for the case with transaction cost of US$0.2 per m
3.  This is due, in part, to the 
fact that the transaction cost are quite high relative to the shadow prices for water, which 
range from US$0.18 to US$1.27 per m
3.  Total net benefits decline substantially, from 
US$871 million at zero transaction cost to US$755 million at transaction cost of US$0.2 
per m
3; gains from trade also drop sharply, from US$122 million to only US$6 million, 
respectively.  Thus, making trading more efficient (reducing transaction cost) has 
significant benefits, increasing both the volume and the benefits from trade. 
5.   CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents a prototype river basin model that includes essential hydrologic, 
agronomic and economic relationships, and reflects the inter-relationships of water and 
salinity, food production, economic welfare, and environmental consequences.  The model 
is applied to the Maipo River Basin in Chile, but due to its generic form and structure can 





The model results show the benefits of water rights trading with water moving into 
higher valued agricultural and municipal and industrial uses.  Net profits in irrigated 
agriculture increase substantially compared to the case of proportional use rights for 
demand sites.  Moreover, agricultural production does not decline significantly.  Net 
benefits for irrigation districts can be even higher than for the basin-optimizing case, as 
farmers reap substantial benefits from selling their unused water rights to municipal and 
industrial areas during the months with little or no crop production.  Finally, making 
trading more efficient, that is, reducing transaction costs, has significant benefits, 
increasing both the amount of trading and the benefits from trade. 
Although these preliminary results show the effectiveness of the model for policy 
analysis and water allocation in the river basin, additional research is needed.  During a 
second research phase, the agricultural production functions will be extended to include 
inputs in addition to land, water, and irrigation technology, such as agricultural chemicals 
and labor.  In addition, the urban water demand functions will be re-estimated based on 
empirical data and disaggregated into household and industrial water demands.  Moreover, 
the power generation will be calibrated to local parameters.  Based on this extension, more 
comprehensive policy analysis will be carried out.  Existing institutions regarding water 
rights, priority allocations, and additional institutional realities will be better represented 
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